

THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

The Official Journal for the FAOs, International Relations Specialists,
and Partners associated with the FAOA Korea Chapter



Korea Chapter

FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION



"Producing the premier leaders of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance since 2020"

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A Message from Colonel Glen “Spoon” Shilland



As I come to the end of a four-year extended tour as Air Attache to the Republic of Korea, I've been asked to share some pearls of wisdom with the FAO community. While I don't think I'm qualified to make any authoritative assertions, since I'm not even a core FAO; I have learned a few things in my 30-year Air Force career. In the last issue of the Joint Communique, Brigadier General Jason (Brad) Nicholson did a great job highlighting the holy trinity of the diplomatic corps: knowledge, communication, and relationships. To these, I would add: learn languages, engage enthusiastically, and make memories.

Although it is possible to be a successful FAO without language ability in your assigned country, it is an order of magnitude easier if you can converse comfortably in your contact's native language. In fact, the more languages you speak, the better you will be at your job, because many of your most useful sources of information may not be from your host nation. The more you can put others at ease, the more open they are to sharing personal opinions and professional facts about areas of interest. Never stop learning and practicing foreign languages; you never know when you might meet someone who speaks Greek!

If learning languages isn't your thing, you can overcome this deficiency with enthusiastic engagement. In your first year at a new post, volunteer for everything, go everywhere you can get access, meet with everyone you can, and fill your calendar with every event you can attend. If you are lucky enough to have your spouse with you, get them invited to everything as well, and take advantage of any other outside contacts they make. The more you and your spouse get involved in activities, the wider your network will be, and the more likely you will get invited to more events. Often the most important part of building relationships is just showing up and engaging enthusiastically.

By far the best part of being a FAO and an attaché is making memories with the people you meet. The whole point of this career field is immersing yourself in other cultures to gain an understanding of alternative perspectives. Remembering unique individual idiosyncrasies and a country's cultural quirks, then incorporating them into future encounters is a key element of building rapport. It is also vitally important to remember these details when you are writing speeches, talking points, reports, or making policy recommendations. Finally, making memories—personal and professional—is what gives your life meaning, so enjoy yourself and live life to its fullest!

Any career field can be frustrating when it doesn't meet your expectations or doesn't provide personal or professional fulfillment. Like everything else in life, getting the most out of your FAO career is all about the effort you put into it, so try to leave it better than you found it. In addition to studying history, honing your communication skills, and maintaining lifelong relationships, the most successful FAOs learn as many languages as possible, engage enthusiastically, and make memories along the way. Good luck, and stay safe, happy, and healthy!

Glen Shilland

GLEN "Spoon" SHILLAND, Colonel, USAF
Air Attaché to the Republic of Korea
14 June 2023

HIGHLIGHTS

A Message from the President



On 12 May, the FAOA Korea Chapter, sponsored by KUSAF, hosted the 2023 FAO Social at the Four Seasons Hotel

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On June 10, the Chapter conducted an interview with Andrew Park, founder of the Korea Mission Group

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On 16 June, the FAOA had dinner with Markus Garlauskas in Seoul

* * * * *

Stay tuned for announcements of exciting new partnerships and opportunities for FAOs

Dear Members, Partners, and Leaders of the FAOA Korea Chapter,

I recently dined out with a foreign diplomat and when discussing events, this diplomat categorized things as being “pre-crisis” and “post-crisis.”

Of course, that must mean before and after the pandemic. Or, so I assumed.

Instead, the terminology applied to before and after a significant diplomatic incident stemming from the unprofessional behavior of another member of this diplomat’s embassy. This unprofessional act was caught on video several years prior. It went viral around the Internet and emblazoned headlines in local and national media.

Was it something you could see almost any weekend walking through a popular university nightlife scene? Probably. But that it was done by a member of the diplomatic community gave it all the more weight.

The act roused protests and demonstration, internet threats and jeers, and political denouncements. Ministries which that country had a special relationship with no longer allowed for free meetings and access. For the diplomats and successive diplomats in the country, they lost trust and relationships built over decades.

“What I wouldn’t give to have an administration that is openly favorable to my country with protestors that come out waving our flag,” remarked the diplomat.

This quarter I offer just a humble reminder of the unique fortune of the situation we find ourselves in with the alliance, how tenuous it could be, and the importance of the responsibility we all carry as diplomats of our nations.

President, FAOA Korea Chapter
Wei C. Chou

A Message from the Editor-In-Chief

Dear Readers,

Since our previous issue we have celebrated 70 years of the ROK-U.S. alliance, a major achievement that many of our members hold an active part in.

I'll be the first to admit that as a British citizen, with no strong personal ties to any military, I have found myself in the somewhat strange position of being the Editor in Chief for a journal run by FAOs that is focused on issues related to the ROK-U.S. alliance.

From an academic standpoint I had previously only read about the alliance (and I didn't really even know what an FAO was until I joined the team...). Nonetheless, through the interactions I have had with our team, members, contributors and distinguished members, I have learnt how important the alliance is and the impact it has had on their lives – not just on paper but in the day to day workings of many of their roles.

Indeed, without the alliance who is to say what other roles people may have been working in or where they may have ended up. With each issue I learn more about the value of the alliance and the responsibility those working within it hold. I look forward to seeing where the alliance is headed in the future, as well as how our members continue to contribute to security in the region (and perhaps even more importantly, I definitely know what a FAO is now!).

In this issue we begin with Polivas Strazdas' reflection of a trip to East Asia with the U.S. Army War College. He remarks upon the importance of

cooperation, between the U.S., ROK and Japan, but also with the Philippines, for security in the Indo-pacific. Then, Mason Richey lays out the meaningful security relationships the ROK has with the European Union (EU) and how the EU can further contribute to regional security.

For this issue we decided to interview one of our distinguished members, and I am grateful that Andrew Kim jumped on a Zoom call to discuss his career in the CIA, where he offered some career advice, as well as his take on issues surrounding security on the Korean peninsula. The interview has been split into two parts, with different themes, and I may be biased as the interviewer, but I recommend you read both.

Next Andrew L. Oros discusses the implications on the ROK's shrinking fighting-age population, with a potentially surprising spin on the benefits it may bring to the alliance. We are also grateful for Andrew I. Park and the Centre for Maritime Strategy for allowing us to reproduce his piece on China's actions in the Taiwan Strait, and recommendations for the U.S.. Lastly, we close with a FAO Billet profile, Assistant Secretary Operations (ASEC-O), provided by Joe Phippen.

As always thank you to our contributors, the team and our supporters who make publishing this journal possible.

With best wishes,



Emily Stamp

STAFF EDITORS




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PITCH AN ARTICLE

If you are interested in pitching an article or book review for the next issue please email:

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A Wicked Problem Set

Reflections from the U.S. Army War College East Asian trip

By Povilas Strazdas

From 17 to 30 April 2023, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) East Asia Regional Seminar (EARS) students traveled to the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Japan. The trip made clear the importance of, and difficulty of achieving, an improved ROK-Japan relationship to attaining U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific. Currently, the ROK is very focused on deterring potential aggression and securing its citizenry from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) threats, while there seems to be an acknowledgment that China also poses a threat. In the framework of the DPRK threat, with a cautious eye on China, there has been discussion of the ROK obtaining nuclear weapons. The DPRK security threat, and a potential ROK nuclear weapon, also impacts the already tense ROK-Japan relationship, making trilateral cooperation between the ROK, Japan, and the U.S. even more difficult in the East China Sea (ECS). Turning to the middle portion of our trip to the Philippines and the South China Sea (SCS), the Philippines needs assurance of support and enhanced capabilities to stand up to China. A ROK-Japan-U.S. trilateral approach would be the best way to assist the Philippines to strengthen its defense capabilities, but given the above issues, it is far from certain to materialize.

Starting with the ROK's domestic desire for a sense of security in the face of DPRK provocations, the DPRK threat is the first and last military consideration for the ROK. This focus constrains the ROK's ability to act off the Korean peninsula militarily, whether in war plans for a hypothetical off-peninsula scenario or in security cooperation with a third-party nation. As the DPRK continues to improve its nuclear capabilities, threatening stability on the peninsula, there has been talk of the ROK obtaining nuclear weapons in case the U.S. nuclear umbrella proves unreliable. While ROK nuclear weapons would add to ROK deterrence against a DPRK attack, the ROK already has the capability conventionally to defeat the DPRK, though likely at a terrible cost to both sides. However, ROK possession of nuclear weapons is unlikely to prevent the DPRK from committing provocations short of armed conflict.

Should the DPRK use its nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that either the ROK or the U.S. would allow the Kim regime to stay in place. The DPRK's use of its nuclear weapons would likely cause the very end-state, overthrow of the Kim regime, the prevention of which led the DPRK to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. The DPRK, however, must convince the world that it is willing to use its nuclear weapons and is a legitimate threat with its missile development program, similar to Russian attempts to use nuclear saber-rattling in Ukraine. If no one believes the DPRK will ever use its weapons, the nuclear weapons and missile program have no value at a bargaining table.

U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris delivers remarks on Philippines Coast Guard ship Teresa Magbanua at Puerto Princesa Port, Philippines on 22 November, 2022. Credit: Reuters



The most likely best-case outcome for the DPRK from its nuclear program is a negotiated settlement, not a compelled result. ROK nuclear weapons might create an additional deterrence against a DPRK invasion, but would not change DPRK behavior or prevent provocations. Meanwhile, the negative trilateral relationship between Japan, the ROK, and the DPRK is worsened by the looming existential threat of DPRK nuclear weapons. All these negative results aside, the ROK obtaining nuclear weapons would likely set off an Asian scramble for nukes, including by Japan. Strengthening the ROK-U.S. relationship, to include faith in the nuclear umbrella, would seem the best way to combat DPRK nuclear weapons.

A nuclear-armed Japan and ROK are unlikely to trust each other or cooperate more than they do now. Increased trilateral cooperation, especially with the U.S., could lead to more effective responses to DPRK provocations at the conventional level and increase confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella in Japan and the ROK. While greater cooperation between the ROK and Japan would not necessarily reduce DPRK provocations, it would increase the ROK and Japan's ability to confront those provocations and, ideally, increase their security. The ROK has substantial historical grievances with Japan, which cannot be ignored or side-stepped, but finding a way to cooperate effectively with Japan would serve the ROK's security interests now. Especially in light of the ROK's capability to plan and conduct large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and its high-functioning defense industrial base, the ROK could be a potent security assistance exporter in conjunction with Japan and the U.S. While Japan has recently increased its defense budget significantly, it is still working through issues on how to defend its own far-flung territory. Japan's military also has not had the single-minded focus on LSCO that the ROK army has had since the Korean War. This makes security cooperation between Japan, the ROK, and the U.S. all the more critical and advantageous to all sides.

“The most likely best-case outcome for the DPRK from its nuclear program is a negotiated settlement, not a compelled result.”

The Philippines is the current recipient of a significant amount of security cooperation from the U.S. and Japan. Given the Philippines' relative inability to push back against China, of the three countries EARS students visited, China has pushed hardest on the Philippines. Internationally, weakness tends to invite aggression, which often leads to miscalculation. Good, clear fences tend to make good neighbors, to paraphrase an old saying. To that end, the U.S., Japan, and Australia are all increasing their cooperation with the Philippines.

The ROK, too, has sold training aircraft to the Philippines but has yet to take a more active role. If the U.S., Japan, and the ROK were all to help increase the Philippines' capabilities and simultaneously assure the Philippines that it was not alone against China, the strategic effect on China could be significant. A strong Philippines would be capable of defending its territory in the SCS, pushing back on disputed Chinese territorial claims, and preventing Chinese extraction of natural resources, including fishing, from Philippine waters. Additionally, a strong Philippines, just south of Taiwan, along with a strong Japan just north of Taiwan, both acting with the U.S., would make any Chinese invasion attempt of Taiwan very perilous.

The possible end-state of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan, with a cooperative Philippines, provides an increased sense of security for ROK and Japanese citizens in the face of DPRK provocation. It could ensure that China will no longer find an easy mark in the Philippines nor a ROK-Japan relationship which is easy to manipulate to China's ends. Additionally, strengthening U.S.-ROK military cooperation off-peninsula would significantly broaden the U.S.-ROK relationship, ideally reinforcing confidence in U.S. support, to include the nuclear umbrella. Achieving that end-state will not be easy or quick. Having traveled to Japan, the ROK, and the Philippines, we met with members of government, military officers, and academics who could all see the positive outcomes of cooperation. They all also acknowledge the difficult road to get there. The U.S. cannot force reconciliation between the ROK and Japan any more than it can create military and law enforcement capabilities in the Philippines overnight. However, continuous U.S. support of mutual goals, with transparency on all sides, offers the best course to achieve a positive outcome for all and a more stable Indo-Pacific region, writ large.

COL Povilas Strazdas is a Eurasian Foreign Area Officer most recently assigned to U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation, Tbilisi. He recently traveled through South Korea, the Philippines and Japan as part of the U.S. Army War College East Asia Regional Studies program.

EU–ROK Security Relations: Room for Growth?

By Dr. Mason Richey

Introduction

As the European Union (EU) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) mark 60 years of diplomatic relations in 2023, the economic and political aspects of their strategic partnership are well known. Total two-way trade between the EU and the ROK is more than \$130 billion, with much of it in critical industrial and technological goods. The EU is the ROK's third largest export market, while the EU is the biggest source of foreign direct investment into the ROK. Diplomatically and politically, the throughput of leader-level and ministerial visits between Europe and the ROK is at an all-time high. To wit, in the wake of the G7 summit earlier this year, a May 21 summit between ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was followed on May 22 by an EU-ROK summit featuring EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel.

What is less visible is the security dimension of EU-ROK relations. This article attempts to shed light on this underappreciated aspect of the EU-ROK strategic partnership.

Context


Security relations between the EU and the ROK do not take place in a vacuum. A panoply of political realities conditions the extent and depth of their cooperation.

On the one hand, EU-ROK relations are nested within geopolitics: the 21st century rise of Asia to global pre-eminence, the global and Indo-Pacific regional power competition between the U.S. and China, the legacy of the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in East Asia and revisionist Russia. On the other hand, EU-ROK security relations are influenced by the dynamics of domestic political factors unique to each polity.

Each of these realities incentivizes certain cooperative behaviors between the EU and the ROK, while disincentivizing others. On the incentive side, mid-sized Asian countries, such as the ROK, have become middle powers capable of shaping changes to the international system through cooperative endeavors, including with the EU. Meanwhile, Asia's growth engine has called for a "European pivot" to Asia, which has led to trade agreements and EU strategic partnerships –

“there is room for both the EU and NATO to play a greater security role both in East Asia and with East Asian partners.”

including security components—with Asian states. The EU Global Strategy and Indo-Pacific Strategy outline areas for Europe's role in East Asia, particularly in domains such as trade, international rule of law, provision of maritime security and access to global maritime commons, digital cooperation, climate change and green growth, and weapons non-proliferation.



President Charles Michel together with President Yoon Suk-yeol and President Ursula von der Leyen, 22 May 2023. Credit: European Council

As for disincentives, aggressive Russian revisionism—most notably in Ukraine—and instability in Europe’s southeastern and Mediterranean neighborhoods have compelled Europe to focus foreign, security and defense policies on areas of geographic proximity. Numerous domestic political and economic factors also cloud EU-ROK security cooperation: terrorism, (im)migration management, economic malaise, post-Brexit effects, and political extremism (especially of the Eurosceptic flavor) have led the EU to inward-focused preoccupations, while domestic political scandal, anemic GDP growth, the threat from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and politico-economic aimlessness following twenty years of democratic capitalist development have made it difficult for ROK to act far beyond Northeast Asia.

Sino-U.S. competition in East Asia and beyond has disparate effects on Europe’s relations with East Asian countries, including EU-ROK security collaboration. On the one hand, the U.S. and China are engaged in high-stakes, destabilizing geostrategic interactions along a range of hard security dimensions—in the South China Sea, the DPRK, Taiwan, anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) in the western Pacific, etc.—that largely exclude EU involvement. On the other hand, the rivalry between the global superpower and the aspiring regional hegemon pushes many East Asian states to hedge by building deeper partnerships with polities outside the U.S.-China dyad. The EU is a natural choice in this regard.

Finally, the U.S.-led alliance system in East Asia, and in particular the alliance with the ROK, exerts a powerful path dependency effect.

The historically exclusive nature of ROK-U.S. security and defense cooperation continues to inhibit other polities from deepening engagement with the ROK in this domain. There are various reasons the ROK is cautious about taking steps to diversify its strategic security partners: (a) defense cooperation with the U.S. requires materiel interoperability and integration, which works against ROK military procurement from non-U.S. suppliers; (b) the ROK is solicitous to not give the impression of downgrading the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance, thus limiting its ability to work with other partners; (c) the ROK government has bandwidth limits, as maintaining full defense and security alliance commitments with the U.S. while also increasing cooperation with other partners outstrips the country’s political, military, and economic resources.

Yet the U.S. is also interested in transforming the hub-and-spoke alliance system in East Asia into a networked model with increasing reliance on trilateral and quadrilateral (so-called minilateral) arrangements. In this transformation there is room for both the EU and NATO to play a greater security role both in East Asia and with East Asian partners.

EU-ROK Security Relations

EU-ROK security relations are anchored in a strategic partnership reflecting the two polities’ shared values and interests. The ROK was the EU’s first partner to have signed all three agreements on political, trade, and security cooperation in EU-led crisis-management operations, and is still the only East Asian state to have a formal security cooperation arrangement with the EU. The foundation of the strategic partnership is a Framework of

Agreement (2010) outlining the rules of the road for EU-ROK political dialogue and cooperation. The Framework Agreement is supported by a 2011 Free Trade Agreement (KOR-EU FTA), the EU’s first comprehensive “next generation” FTA with an Asian country.

“Of special interest is burgeoning EU-ROK cooperation on cybersecurity and cyberthreats”

The security dimension of the EU-ROK strategic partnership is embodied in a Framework Participation Agreement (2014) that facilitates ROK participation in Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions and operations via guidelines on financing, deployment conditions, chain of command, and more.

The crisis management agreement has already been put to use in executing combined EU-ROK missions within the EU’s Operation Atalanta effort combating piracy in the western Indian Ocean. This is an obvious place for the EU and the ROK to cooperate, as the two polities have convergent free trade interests threatened in the region, are keen upholders of international law, and can work together under the umbrella of UN-sanctioned action. Going beyond CSDP missions, security cooperation between Brussels and Seoul appears even brighter.

ANALYSIS

Indeed, the Framework Agreement lays out areas of cooperation between the two signatories, including provisions on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), cyberthreats, money laundering and illicit trafficking, and the promotion of human rights and the international legal order more generally. Of special interest is burgeoning EU-ROK cooperation on cybersecurity and cyberthreats. This is institutionalized in the EU-ROK Cyber Dialogue, an annual Vice-Ministerial-level meeting ongoing since 2013.

Obviously the U.S. and China dominate the security and defense sectors of East Asia, and thus Europe is comparatively out in the cold, but both the EU and its member states do make other important contributions to the maintenance of the East Asian and Indo-Pacific order. First, they have a massive economic presence in East Asia, which entails a security interest in upholding the norms of the current international/regional regime. Thus Europe actively maintains the international and regional system in terms of international law in a range of areas: non-proliferation, maritime security, human rights, counter-terrorism, sea-lines-of-communication, sanctions, and territorial and maritime dispute resolution. These actions contribute indirectly to ROK national security by promoting a stable, predictable environment within which it can hedge between China and the U.S.

Beyond that, Europe plays an understated but meaningful role in countering Pyongyang's weapons programs and other malfeasance. Most visibly, perhaps, the EU vigorously enforces both international and enhanced voluntary sanctions against the DPRK, part of the effort—led by the ROK, Japan, and the U.S.—to curb its WMD (especially nuclear) and missile development.

The EU's own sanctions—going beyond those of the UN—have steadily ratcheted up since 2016 to cover everything from commodities to education, training, and scientific exchanges. European companies are prohibited from investing in any DPRK industry connected with conventional armaments, including metallurgy, aviation, information technology, chemicals, mining, and refining, and several EU member states are active in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Dozens of DPRK individuals are also sanctioned (with travel bans and asset freezes). The EU (with Japan) has also co-sponsored UN resolutions targeting the DPRK's human rights abuses.

Conclusion

The EU and its member states have established extensive, meaningful, ongoing security relations with the ROK, and certainly contribute to security in East Asia more broadly. Going forward, however, many of the challenges facing Europe and the ROK are likely to diminish both sides' overall power, in turn diminishing their ability to support each other's security concerns in the face of non-state and non-conventional threats and/or potential destabilizing state revisionism by the DPRK, China, or Russia.

In this regard, the ROK's biggest short-term difficulty is clearly the DPRK. Pyongyang's threatening capabilities, posture and rhetoric make it difficult for Seoul to look far afield in applying scarce assets to crisis management. In the long term, the ROK's biggest challenge is perhaps domestic, as politico-economic corruption and recent scandals have revealed shortcomings in the ROK's leading institutions. Moreover, the country is facing a dramatic demographic crunch and the imperative of adapting to new forms of creativity-driven globalization.

For the EU and its member states, there are several obstacles to greater contribution to East Asian security and order. One obstacle is Europe's conflicted relations with China: Europe has been reluctant to use its considerable economic firepower vis-à-vis China to pressure Beijing to refrain from destabilizing actions in East Asia, or to persuade it to adopt a more coercive line toward the DPRK. The EU has become more geopolitical, but business interests are still key to shaping EU-China relations. Europe has the diplomatic and economic power potential to intervene selectively—with strategic partners such as the ROK—in East Asian security issues, but its political will is inconsistent in interactions with Beijing.

Were that fact to change, there are further opportunities for Europe to contribute to security and order in East Asia and the ROK in particular. Transatlantic security cooperation in Asia would top the list. The U.S. and Europe would be well advised to link Atlantic and Pacific security networks and create patterns of cooperation between, for example, NATO and the AP4 countries (the ROK, Japan, and Australia, and New Zealand). There is also an opportunity (and necessity) for establishing better space and cybersecurity cooperation between Europe and East Asian countries. Finally, just to select one area among several, the EU could contribute greatly to the slowing of the DPRK's nuclear program by sanctioning more banks and financial institutions that have any role in linking the DPRK's foreign exchange activities to that country's nuclear and missile/rocket programs (so-called secondary financial sanctions).

Mason Richey is professor of International Politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Seoul) and senior contributor at Asia Society Korea. His research focuses on EU CSDP/CFSP in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. foreign and security policy in East Asia, and great power politics. Recent articles have appeared in venues including *Asian Survey*, *Political Science*, *Journal of International Peacekeeping* and more. He is also a frequent participant in a variety of Track 1.5 meetings on Indo-Asia-Pacific security and foreign policy issues.

An Interview with Andrew Kim:

Life lessons from 28 years of CIA service

CAREER

For this issue, our Editor in Chief Emily Stamp was delighted to interview one of our distinguished members, Andrew Kim, for an interview on his career and what he learnt during his years of service in the CIA.

For his takes on pressing issues surrounding the Korean peninsula, and further career advice, see Part 2 on page 18.

So the first thing I really want to discuss are the pivotal moments of your career. What were they and how did your career goals change over time?

Definitely I have one [a pivotal moment], which I think people will be a little bit surprised by. It was the moment where I decided to come back after I retired. I retired twice after 27 years of service. When I came back from my last overseas tour, I was going into that whole transition of being back to society. Then four months later I was asked to come back to start this new Korean mission center in the agency [CIA] because the Trump administration came in and they really wanted to focus on North Korea. So, I decided to come back and give it one more shot.

What I wasn't expecting was a complete different feeling of serving in the same organization. When I was serving in the CIA, you know as we all do [you are] in a situation where you want to get along with your colleagues and sometimes you make compromises and make sure that the whole relationship with all the folks is going smooth. And then also you are thinking about your next assignment, next promotion, all those things that come with your career. When I came back from my retirement, I only came back to do one mission for a couple of years. So I just feel a kind of a weight was lifted from me and I don't have to worry about a lot [about] those types of issues and only focus on my mission.

It was just so good that I recommend to some of my colleagues that you should retire once and come back, you have a different perspective. So that was a kind of a pivotal moment which I wasn't expecting, coming back in a very senior position was kind of a different trajectory of my career.



Especially, I can say that as an intel career officer I was focusing on collection of intelligence in a foreign field. But in my last two years, after I come back from retirement, the things that I was involved was heavily on the policy side, coordination of the policy as well as sometimes leading the whole U.S. government's effort to single mission. That was something that I hadn't really thought that I was going to end up doing when I started.

Is there any advice that you've been given that would help people navigate their career, as not everyone gets a chance to retire and then come back?

It's probably easy for me to say it because I finished my career and I'm out. It's probably not fair for people who are in the middle of their career and sometimes they are at a very important juncture of their career to make a decision.

What I will say is let it go, because actually things are playing naturally at the end. Anxieties and putting yourself under your own pressure may not really help you. So sometimes when you get to that point when you have to make a hard decision, you just need to step back and really think hard and really think about if you are taking a natural course or you are trying to alter a course that may not playing favor to you at the end.

So what I will say is if you are in your career and you really have to think hard about certain things, pause, because when you're running hard you don't see things around you, you only see things in front of you. But when you stop running and start walking you have all the room to look around and see what's around you.

Was there ever a time in your career you thought you should have stopped and looked around you and you didn't?

Oh yes, there's definitely times where I wanted to make sure that it [an operation] was successfully finished and finished in a very reasonable time and so I pressured myself, I pressured my colleagues, everybody to accomplish that. But a couple of times I realized that particular project will end successfully anyway. So yes I had a couple of incidents where I thought I should have just taken a better, natural course rather than start to alienate my colleagues by being a hardcore kind of person.

In those times of stress, what sort of things would you do to relax?

I know that my escape is to spend more time with my kids and my family. So every time I got to the point where [I thought] 'okay I need to slow down a little bit', I know there is room for me to go and take my kids out, to baseball games or do things.

I was wondering if there is any advice that you hear commonly that you actually think isn't useful.

Oh yeah there is a lot. I'm probably one of them too right. A lot of people kind of tell you you've got to be a leader and you have to show your leadership, which is, which is very valuable advice. But there are certain people that are material to be a good leader, some of them are good managers. Managers and leaders are different, and sometimes we give people advice without giving the definitions. So you really have to understand yourself, do you want to be a leader, do you want to be a manager or a follower.

So I think if you want to give someone advice, you have to think before you say it, knowing who you are giving this advice to and understanding that person's kind of capability.

The other thing is I know in our society people say 'if you are not sitting at the table you are going to be on the menu' which means you've got to be aggressive, and proactive in everything you do. But sometimes you are assigned to certain countries where the culture is a little different, where such behavior may come across as too aggressive. So you probably have to give them [advice about] when it is appropriate and necessary, you also have to be very humble right.



Looking back on your career, what parts were the most personally exciting or satisfying parts for you?

So I'm a very typical CIA operations officer in a way. In [the] agency we said 'the worst day in the field is still better than the best day in Washington'. So I grew up in an organization where it is field driven. I had a total of 7 field overseas tours and every tour I had I really cherished. It comes with different locations, with different characteristics and different missions and focus. I really thoroughly enjoyed every overseas assignment that I had. I wasn't that happy when I was in headquarters in DC. So when you say that something excites me, it's when I start a new assignment in the field.

In the field means you are kind of on the ground, you are making things happen and you are basically, I will say, [the] ears and eyes of the US government overseas. That's how we feel when we are in the field, that everything we do really counts. But, you know people who are working in headquarters, [their work] is very important and a high value task too. Definitely in the field we don't have bureaucratic obstacles and we don't get a lot of attention from a lot of policy makers.

What was it like when you were not in the field?

I served at different levels, when I was in the deputy division chief level I had to make a lot of personnel decisions. It is a very important job but it comes with a lot of responsibility and it also touches a lot of people's careers right, and that is not something I really enjoyed. And then also honestly in the headquarters I realized as a manager we have a lot of people who do more than 100% of their tasks and there's definitely a slacker too.



Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the former CIA director, and Andrew Kim, (on Left) have dinner with North Korea's Kim Yong Chol, a former intelligence chief, in New York on 30 May 2018. Credit: U.S. State Department.

I spend more time with the slackers, people who are not meeting their workload and try to guide them to be efficient and effective. I felt like I should spend more time with those people who are pulling the weight, more than their weight to guide them, so they can be ascending officers in our organization.

They are all human beings, they like to get some attention for the work they do and as a manager, I should give them that attention they deserve. But because I had to sometimes spend so much of the day tackling some personnel issues, I could not spend time with them.

Was there ever a time you felt very overwhelmed and how did you persevere?

I guess I'm kind of lucky that I never really had any serious issues other than when I served in a 'deny area'. When I worked in those countries, it's really stressful, intensity is really high. But I never had an issue, actually I really enjoyed it so much.

It [issues] comes from the family. We regularly, every two or three years, had to move to other countries and my kids were growing up in foreign countries. We were lucky that they are well adapted to such kinds of lifestyles. But there's a couple of moments where my kids were in middle school, where they had a bunch of a friends, a social life and start to blossom and we had to pull them out and go to another place. You can see the tears coming out of their eyes. That's when I regret a couple of times about my career and how I put my kids into that. But at the end they get over it very quickly and adapt to a new environment very well.

I always preach it but we really paid attention to their behavior when they get to a new place, and we intentionally took a few furniture to have familiarity when we move. So there's a few tricks that we did to make sure we got over that.

See Part 2 on page 18 for Andrew Kim's take on current issues affecting the Korean peninsula on page. He delves into the most pressing issues for those working on the Korean peninsula and what people should be focusing on, as well as providing further career advice.

The ROK's Shrinking Fighting-Age Population May Make the ROK-US Alliance Even Stronger

by Andrew L. Oros

Media headlines are again hyping concerns about the Republic of Korea's (ROK) future due to the continued slide in its birth rate and the rapid aging and gradual shrinking of its total population size. The birth rate once again hit a record low in 2022, which will lead to more dramatic population shrinkage by century's end. According to [2022 UN Population Division statistics](#), by 2050 the ROK's total population is projected to shrink by roughly 7 million people and its working-age population (aged 20-64) by nearly 12 million – and this shrinkage will accelerate if the ROK's birth rate continues to decline. (All future population statistics in this article also are derived from UN projections using a constant fertility rate.) These trends are indeed troubling but in the shorter timeframe that military planners tend to focus on, the ROK's management of its population transition offers many opportunities for the ROK-U.S. alliance that both states already are benefitting from and that will likely deepen through the 2020s. More broadly, Asia's "aging powers" – which also include Japan, China, Taiwan, Russia, and North Korea – are all on a path to increase their military capabilities this decade despite the demographic challenges they face. This trend differs from predictions of the likely conduct of "aging powers" commonly argued by scholars and media pundits.

Aging brings to mind images of frailty and dependence. But aging also implies wisdom, stability, and even wealth. In the case of the ROK military, its economy, and the ROK-U.S. alliance, the latter adjectives are better descriptors of an older ROK society adapting to its demographic challenges ahead – strength in older age. In addition, the increase in ROK life expectancy from about 62 years of age in 1970 to 84 in 2022 also should be celebrated for its positive achievement for human development and economic productivity.

It was only a generation ago that the ROK was considered a developing country, rather than the tenth-largest economy in the world that it is today. In part due to a generation of aging workers who were less educated and less healthy now retiring, economic forecasters expect the ROK economy to grow in total economic size by about [70% through 2050](#) despite the dramatically shrinking working-age population

that is the ROK's medium-term demographic destiny. This projected economic growth will help the ROK manage the challenge of maintaining defense spending while also increasing social welfare spending to provide for a larger retired population. Indeed, in the first year after the ROK's total population began to shrink in 2020, [economic growth surged to 4%, an eleven-year high](#).

Substantial improvements to the ROK military also are planned for the coming decade, despite a dramatic drop in the number of fighting-age ROK citizens – and in some ways probably because of this drop. Due to the plain reality that there simply are 30% fewer young men than a generation ago, senior leaders have no choice but to address long-known limitations of the roughly two-year universal male conscription system that was created under very different circumstances than present ROK society faces. Defense spending has [increased by 34%](#) (in Korean won) from 2017 through 2022 to implement this transformation, with a further increase of [6.8% planned annually for the next five years](#).

The ROK military's transformation-in-progress is necessitated by a demographic imperative, but it parallels similar transformations underway in the most advanced militaries worldwide. China's military transformation over the past two decades shows many similarities in investing in the development and deployment of better military technology, and shrinking the size of its total military forces in order to pay them better and retain them longer for the purpose of having a more effective force – despite China not needing to shrink its force size due to demographic challenges at this stage. In addition, China's military transformation itself contributes to the ROK's moves – as does North Korea's growing capabilities and provocative behavior.

The ROK experienced a [record-low fertility rate of 0.78 in 2022](#), a further drop below the 1.0 threshold first breached in 2018. The ROK fertility rate has not been at the 2.1 replacement level since 1983 – four decades ago – which is why the number of young men of conscription age continues to decline year on year.

The increasing rate of decline in fertility will have even greater implications for the ROK military in the 2040s, when those recently born reach military-service age, but even the present drop in number of young men of conscription age is serious – based on the non-replacement fertility rate in 2003 of 1.17. The number of 20-year-old men peaked in 1989 at just over half a million, falling to 456,000 in 2001 and 311,000 in 2021. This number is projected to fall below 150,000 in 2042, illustrating the stark reality that motivates the ROK’s recent defense-planning moves.

Paradoxically, the ROK-U.S. alliance will benefit from changes implemented due to the ROK’s demographic pressures in three important ways – at least in the shorter term. First, although the total number of ROK forces have declined by about 14% from a decade ago (from 659,500 in 2012 to 555,000 in 2022), the ratio of volunteer to conscripted forces is in the process of a substantial shift, resulting in a much better-trained military. In addition, a wide array of new technology is being developed and introduced to handle many functions that underpaid young men previously were forced to perform – as well as new technologies that will vastly exceed previous capabilities, despite the smaller total force size. At this juncture, it is worth noting that the postwar history of Asia’s military competition has shown that the number of military personnel has not been a good indicator of military capability overall – though Northeast Asia’s smaller-personnel armies (Japan, ROK, and Taiwan) all were bolstered by their military alliances with the U.S.

This leads to a third area of change in the ROK’s defense planning that is incentivized by the ROK’s demographic transition: a deepening and broadening of its security partnership with the U.S. In combination with the above two factors – better/longer training and better/more technology – the two militaries have more areas for collaboration, including a potential for greater interoperability of military forces and equipment. Moreover, the declining number of ROK military personnel expected in the coming decades underscores the benefit of additional forces provided by security partners such as the U.S.. This pressure also may partly explain the ROK’s growing reproachment with Japan, another U.S. ally facing significant population shrinkage in the next several decades.

Looking beyond the 2020s, the ROK’s demographic challenges will become much more severe. Pundits are correct to point to ballooning social spending and labor shortfalls that will likely result, to name just two major concerns. But the demographic challenges of the ROK’s major security rivals, North Korea and China – as well as Russia – also will become severe in the 2030s.

“In combination with the above two factors – better/longer training and better/more technology – the two militaries have more areas for collaboration, including a potential for greater interoperability of military forces and equipment.”

North Korea's total population is projected to begin to shrink around 2036, and already North Korea faces the challenge of maintaining a force more than twice the size of the ROK's with less than half the ROK's population size. With both states experiencing shrinking populations, demographers expect their population size ratio will remain roughly the same as now. Due to China's massive population size and high youth unemployment rate, China is not likely to experience the same challenges in staffing its military that the two Koreas will – though certainly it will face daunting social challenges associated with rapid aging.

These rival states will benefit from seeing how earlier aging states like Japan and the ROK have adapted, however, and also are more able to push through necessary policy changes due to their authoritarian governments.



ROK military drones during the Combined Joint Live-Fire Exercise between the ROK and U.S. at the Seungjin Fire Training Field in Pocheon, Gyeonggi Province on 25 May 2023.
Credit: Ministry of National Defense (ROK).

Thus, when considering its security rivals as well as its worsening demographic situation in the coming decades, the ROK does indeed face serious challenges ahead – but it is encouraging that we have seen in recent defense planning documents a number of new policies to address this population shift. The U.S., despite being the only current major power with a substantially growing population (in addition to India), nonetheless also faces serious recruiting shortfalls for its military – and also is now aging faster than demographers had predicted. Thus, for the U.S. as well, deepening security partnerships even with “aging allies” like the ROK and Japan show benefits for both sides of the alliance. Together, the U.S. and its allies show the wisdom and power of aging states.

Andrew L. Oros is Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Washington College in Chestertown, Maryland. His latest book is *Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the 21st Century* (Columbia University Press, 2017). For further reading see his article in *Asia Policy* (April 2023): *The Rising Security Challenge of East Asia's 'Dual Graying': Implications for U.S.-led Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific*.

Washington Must Break China's New Normal in the Taiwan Strait

By Andrew I. Park

Washington's response to Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait was not enough. China recently concluded a three-day series of military exercises near Taiwan, culminating in a simulated air and maritime blockade.

These exercises, designated "Joint Sword," involved a significant number of People's Liberation Army (PLA) warplanes and warships. 91 PLA warplanes entered Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), featuring nuclear-capable H-6K bombers, accompanied by fighter jets, early warning, and electronic jamming aircraft. Taiwan's Defense Ministry reported that 54 of these warplanes crossed the unofficial "median line" of the Taiwan Strait, conducting multiple simulated precision strikes on critical Taiwanese targets. Concurrently, 12 PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels, led by the Type 002 aircraft carrier Shandong, were observed in the waters surrounding Taiwan. These exercises, conducted in response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the U.S. and meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, were perceived as a "serious warning" from Beijing. This was not the first instance where Beijing conducted extensive military exercises simulating a blockade around Taiwan. Less than a year prior, China executed a four-day series of live-fire exercises near Taiwan, following then U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's August 2022 visit to Taipei.

Responding to operation Joint Sword,

the U.S. Navy dispatched the USS Milius (DDG-69) to conduct a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP). However, it was only on the final day of the PLA exercise that the destroyer sailed through the South China Sea near the Spratly Islands, located 850 nautical miles away from Taiwan. The destroyer did not traverse through the Taiwan Strait until almost a week after the exercise. This level of response by the U.S. government appears insufficient to address Beijing's aims, since China continues to engage in a risky gambit in the Taiwan Strait.

China is Gaining More from the Exercises than You Think

In 2022, the PLA deployed a remarkable total of 1,727 warplanes into Taiwan's ADIZ, significantly more than previous years. Through these exercises and intrusions, the PLA is refining its ability to isolate Taiwan and is perfecting its advancing capabilities.

Washington must not be intimidated by the Chinese aggression and continue its high-level engagement with Taipei.

Beijing is using high-level government official meetings between the U.S. and Taiwan as pretexts to test its military capability and accumulate operational and tactical experience on a massive scale.

After being commissioned in December 2019 as China's first indigenously-built aircraft carrier, Shandong participated in its first major training in the Western Pacific, where carrier-based J-15 fighters executed up to 80 simulated strike missions. Furthermore, the PLA is acquiring knowledge about Taiwanese defenses while winning the "war of attrition" against the island nation. And by conducting frequent intrusions into Taiwan's ADIZ, the PLA has compelled the Taiwanese Air Force to expend 24.24 million US dollars on spare parts and maintenance.

The New Normal

Beijing prioritizes making political gains. This development suggests that Beijing is fostering a "new normal" of intensified aggression in the Taiwan Strait which echoes the belligerent posture adopted by North Korea. Since its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has conducted five additional nuclear tests, accompanied by an array of missile launches, totaling over 90 instances involving various types of missiles and rockets. Consequently, well before the 68 tests in 2022, the South Korean public had grown acclimated to the "new normal" wherein ballistic missiles routinely flew overhead.

ANALYSIS



A J-15 fighter jet prepares to land on the Chinese navy's Liaoning aircraft carrier during open-sea combat training, in a photo released 31 December, 2021. Credit: Hu Shanmin/Xinhua via AP

Paradoxically, under the nuclear umbrella provided by Washington, the South Korean public developed a desensitization to Pyongyang's military threat, prioritizing domestic over security challenges.

The recent November 2022 Taiwanese local elections exhibit a comparable phenomenon. In spite of China's heightened military threat, President Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which advocated for a strong position on Beijing, was outperformed by the opposition party, Kuomintang (KMT). Although local election outcomes in Taiwan do not necessarily reflect the public's attitude towards China, the 2022 local election unveiled the Taiwanese public's electoral resistance against the DPP's incorporation of China into political discourse. As Taiwan's presidential election is slated for January 2024, it is likely that Beijing will sustain momentum in the Strait, where it can embrace the new normal by refining its capabilities without concern for political repercussions from the Taiwanese political landscape.

Coercion: Winning Without a War

In line with Sun Tzu's dictum that the ultimate form of warfare vanquishes the enemy without engaging in battle, China's strategic use of intimidation could lead to victory. A recent CSIS wargame posits that, should China invade Taiwan, China would likely be unsuccessful. Even if the PLA attained advanced military capabilities, the coalition of liberal democratic nations plus the PLA's limited combat experience would hinder China from achieving an optimal outcome.

As a result, Beijing may opt for coercive reunification with Taiwan, circumventing direct military engagement. Admiral (ret.) Davidson and CIA Director Burns indicate the PLA will persist in enhancing its capabilities and accruing experience through provocations and exercises, possibly to the point where Beijing feels sufficiently confident to initiate an invasion. Nonetheless, this need not necessarily culminate in an actual military confrontation. Demonstrating political resolve and the PLA's capacity to the Taiwanese populace may be enough to induce reunification through "peaceful integration".

Recommendations

Pelosi and McCarthy's meetings with Tsai, along with continued bipartisan delegations to Taipei, signify Washington's dedication to Taiwan's democracy. Washington must not be intimidated by the Chinese aggression and continue its high-level engagement with Taipei. Further, to reassure the Taiwanese public of its steadfast commitment, Washington must fully implement the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA) enacted as part of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act which authorized up to 10 billion US dollars in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants and loans for Taiwan through 2027. As a result, Washington and Taipei can participate in joint long-term planning for the procurement, deployment, and maintenance of essential capabilities. Importantly, TERA conveys support for incorporating Taiwan in the Rim of the Pacific exercise, from which China has been excluded since 2018. The U.S. must also augment the FMF budget allocation to broaden assistance and training for Taiwan. Lastly, Washington must also collaborate with its allies and partners to amplify FONOPs in the Taiwan Strait, countering any future endeavors by Beijing to escalate its illicit activities that undermine the principle of the law of the sea.

This article was previously published on the Maritime Operations Center.

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An Interview with Andrew Kim:

Life lessons from 28 years of CIA service

In terms of the Korean peninsula, what do you think people in the field should be focusing on now?

If I knew that answer I would have probably already solved the denuclearisation issue when I was in my job!

I think, compared to a few years back, the Russian invasion of Ukraine will affect [regional] leader's calculation. How the U.S. is involved in this, how the EU play into it, how to forecast what will happen. You just have to kind of watch what will play into this conflict and how they [Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un] view this. How they read into what the U.S. will do if there is some kind of conflict happening in north-east Asia.

I think definitely the Chinese calculation has probably changed since that [invasion of Ukraine] happened, same as Kim Jong-un.

Then, when Hong Kong returned to China [in 1997], the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) really emphasized the fact that they were gonna make the 'one country, two systems' correct. One of my assignments was Hong Kong, and I watched it. I know it was painful for them [the Chinese] as they wanted to change a lot of things so quickly but they had to honor it. Not because they wanted to make Hong Kong people happy, they want Taiwan[ese] people to watch so they can convince Taiwan people that the system works. So that's why they put a lot of effort and it went on for 20 years until a few years ago when there was the huge demonstrations in Hong Kong with the students., Even that, when the CCP could easily deploy the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to crush the whole demonstration, but they really resisted and tried not to do so until really at the last point.

What I see it as, is at that point, the CCP made a decision that if they want to take over Taiwan, it's not going to be 'one country two systems', it has to be by military. So, that's sort of my theory, and if that's the truth then at some point China is going to flex their muscle and they are going to try and take Taiwan in a military way.

If that happens, [with] the 50,000 some thousand troops in Japan and 28,000 troops in South Korea, it's gonna be a little bit of a problem for China to do something in that region. I say this is my theory, [that China is] kind of holding our USFK troops in hostage.

If North Korea agrees to do some kind of provocation in the DMZ area, that way U.S. military folks, as well as the South Korean military, cannot move out of the peninsula to help in Taiwan. So there will be a lot of those kinds of calculations that start to come into it.

Right now in U.S. policy China is still number one. One issue they [the Biden administration, congress, the senate] all agree is anti-china. So I think that INDO-PACOM is going to be asking for more resources and I think they are getting it, because of China.

We'll see this provocation from North Korea time to time but the bigger picture here is how are we managing the China issue. You can't really play checkers, you have to play a chess game with China. It's not just the military issues, but its economic, security - there's a lot connected with China. Washington has to think about diplomatic plays and how to secure the supply chain we heavily rely on China for.

2 JUNE 2023

For South Korea, the Biden-Yoon summit has just happened, as well as the Washington Declaration- do you have any thoughts on those?

I mean the Washington Declaration itself is a very important declaration and I think South Korea more so than the US really wanted that. I have heard there was a back and forth making sure the verbiage [was right]. A lot of people worked on it, and really put a lot of energy and time to make that happen.

I think what you need to focus on is that in [South] Korean politics, every five years there will be a new administration. This Washington Declaration would never happen in the previous administration. It only happened because of the new administration and they have only four years left. After four years there will be a new president, a new administration. We don't know what will happen. If the next administration happen to be more pro-alliance focused then that would be great. But if that doesn't happen then you've got a four year time kind of limit. What can we do within those four years to really solidify that relationship and certain commitments? I know this already started because we are doing military exercises and we are going back to the same level or more which is really great.

So I think if you are a decision maker or a practitioner I would probably start thinking, okay in the next four years what can we do to enhance further, to make some kind of a commitment into this or to keep this as a longer agreement.

What are some lessons you have learned from dealing with North Korea that you think would be useful to impart?

I learned a lot of lessons from that, but this is something that probably a lot of people who work on the North Korea issue already know, but let me just repeat it. In 1974's Kim Jong-un's father, Kim Jong-Il stepped up in a leadership role. The founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung died in 1994, so Kim Jong-Il had 20 years to solidify his power and got to know a lot of people, what we call elites in North Korea. Kim Jong-Il had ample time to assess who he will keep, who he will keep out, who he thinks is more loyal.

So when he took over, I shouldn't say smooth, but there was not so many rapid kind of executions. Well, Kim Jong-un came into power, was introduced to the central party in 2009 then, and then 2011 his father died so he only had 2 years. That's almost one tenth of what his father had to prepare for the leadership role. So that's why we saw a lot of those executions because he somehow felt [he had to] solidify his power quickly. So I think that time is over, I think he feels like he is in control right now.

But what he feels uneasy about right now is his family, they call them *Baekdu-hyeoltong* [Mount Paektu bloodline]. When his Grandfather founded North Korea there was enough relatives, who occupied a lot of senior leadership and that size really started to shrink. I feel Kim Jong-un feels he doesn't have many of his own loyal family members that he can rely on. Maybe that's why he started showing his daughter at all those events, to show his people that his family are still alive.

So, I think what you're looking at in North Korea is a guy who thinks he is in total control of the country but he feels that he somehow [needs to] demonstrate to his own people via family who controls North Korea, who is still strong.

He's probably going to wait until the Biden administration is over to start engaging with the U.S. because something the North Korean's I saw learn their own lesson. In 2000, when back then Secretary of State [Madeleine] Albright went to North Korea and met with Kim Jong-Il and everything was going towards normalizing relationships between North Korea and the U.S.. [Bill] Clinton was supposed to go- the president at the time, in December to sign that whole normalization.

But in November [George W.] Bush won the election, so with that landscape change in Washington Clinton could not go. So what North Korea really hoped, for several years they worked on, just went down the toilet. So lesson learned by North Korea: if they want to do some kind of negotiation with the U.S., they have to start very early on in any of those U.S.' administrations, because if you wait until last they don't know what will happen after the election.

I don't think they are gonna start now [with the Biden administration] knowing that they only have a couple more years. They probably aren't going to do that either with South Korea. So they are going to continue to be isolated for the next couple of years. But, they want to make sure that everyone knows that they still exist and are very important, so they are gonna do some kind of testing to irritate other countries, but I think that's about it. I don't think they are really going to do something that radical to really tip the balance.

My last question, do you have any book recommendations?

I read a lot of books, that doesn't mean I am smart or intellectual, but one thing I learned from my mentor was that you've got to have intellectual curiosity whatever you do and you also have to be very critical of things that you face. So with that what I would recommend is not the specific book. I really recommend you read books from the country where you serve. For instance, a FAO officer in Korea, I recommend you to go to a Korean bookstore and find the best sellers to help you understand the area you cover.

Would you say the same for other types of media as well, so TV, movies, Youtube?

Oh yeah, but did you say Youtube? Be a little careful about what youtuber you are looking at as it can be dis-serving you with one sided stories.

“I see the FAO officers are very capable, very critical, in the kind of the work they do”

On May 9, 2018, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (at the time, on right) was accompanied by Andrew Kim, head of the CIA's Korea Mission Center (KMC), during his second visit to North Korea.



Tik-Tok?

Tik-Tok - I'm not into it at all. It's just coming out of China, I'm having nothing to do with it.

Thanks so much for your time, is there anything else you want to share?

FAO officers I really have a lot of respect for you. I served overseas in an embassy setting and I worked with a lot of your former FAO officers, they are very capable.

I would also like to point out, an agency intel officer is a different type of career. I see the FAO officers are very capable, very critical, in the kind of the work they do. Sometimes I see them in an embassy as an attaché, and they are more diplomatic than actually our state colleagues. I am very impressed with most of the people I work with, so keep it up. Please enjoy your career and enjoy your foreign assignments. You don't have to work everyday, take advantage of being overseas and different countries. Go and visit different parts of those countries so that you will have good memories. Because that's one thing I regret, when I was in seven different countries I was so focused on work, I really could not travel outside the capital city of that country. Now I am starting to travel back to the countries I served in to just visit different parts. So enjoy your time.

Sung Hyun “Andrew” Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School. Prior to this, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford University. Mr. Kim retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 28 years of service and was the first Assistant Director of the CIA, Korea Mission Center. As the Chief of CIA Station in three major East Asian cities, Mr. Kim managed the collection, analysis, production, and distribution of information that directly affected national security. He is a recipient of the CIA Director's Award and the Presidential Rank Award.

The FAOA Korea Chapter Billet Profile: Assistant Secretary – Operations (ASEC-O)

The Korean peninsula is home to U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), which accounts for over 25,000 servicemembers. The vast majority of U.S. forces are there as a demonstration of hard-power deterrence as part of the ROK-US alliance, but a small contingent of the United Nations Command (UNC) is solely dedicated to monitoring the maintenance of the Korean Armistice Agreement (1953).

The Operations Officer of the UNC Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) Secretariat, officially known as the Assistant Secretary – Operations (ASEC-O), is a billet that has existed since 1951. Originally began as the negotiation team that brokered the Armistice Agreement, the UNCMAC was then charged to supervise the implementation of the Armistice until a permanent peace treaty was concluded. Over 70 years later, the ASEC-O continues to coordinate all operations in the southern half of the DMZ from access approvals, constructions requests, inspecting armistice compliance of military units in the DMZ, making official notifications to the North Korean People's Army, demining, remains recovery, emergency helicopter operations for medical evacuation or wildfire suppression, and conducting special investigations of potential armistice violations.

In accomplishing these tasks, the UNCMAC Secretariat's Operations Section is comprised of a core team of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCCO) from over seven different nations, each of the US military departments, and the entire array of military disciplines from ground combat, air operations, and combat service support. The ASEC-O and his team routinely updates each of the 18 military attaches that represent forces contributed to UNC, as well as providing transparency to the neutral nations of Switzerland, Sweden, and Poland as stipulated in the Armistice Agreement.



The ASEC-O observes the repatriation of Korean War remains to the PRC with Swiss and ROK counterparts.

In an environment that is forward stationed, operationally relevant, and even includes limited interaction with adversary forces, the UNCMAC Secretariat is truly the nexus of political-military operations on the Korean peninsula. Foreign Area Officers from any of the services would be privileged to serve in such a unit. Marine officers that are interested should contact their Primary MOS monitor and inquire about JDAL billets in South Korea.

The ASEC-O billet is assigned by the Ground Combat Arms Major's Monitor (MAC-11) as part of the normal manpower assignments process.

While the ASEC-O has been allotted to the Marine Corps, the UNCMAC Secretariat is home to FAO-designated billets of the Army, Navy, and Air Force from the O-4 to O-6 level.

Contact your branch manager or UNCMAC at indopacom.humphreys.uncmac.list.ops@army.mil for more information.

Contributed by: Major Joe Phippen (U.S. Marines)

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The FAOA Korea Chapter would like to thank the following organizations for their generous support:



The **Korea-United States Alliance Foundation** is an organization committed to promoting the ROK-U.S. Alliance and the contribution of the United States Forces Korea to security and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The Foundation exists to financially support the management and operations of the Korea Defense Veterans Association; to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance through programs that facilitate education, discussion and research on the Alliance; and to promote the honor and welfare of both countries' armed forces personnel and their families.



The **Korea Defense Veterans Association's** mission is to enhance the ROK-U.S. Alliance by advocating for the Alliance and supporting the people who built and serve the Alliance. KDVA seeks to enhance, advocate for, and educate about the ROK-U.S. Alliance; recognize and support service members, government civilians, and their families who have or are serving in the ROK-U.S. Alliance; serve its members with professional networking, mentoring, volunteering, and researching opportunities; honor and support the veterans who defended South Korea during the Korean War.



The **United States Embassy Association** is a private, non-government, non-appropriated employee organization, established under the rules of the U.S. Department of State for the benefit of its members. It provides activities, facilities, programs, personal services, and lodging in order to bring a little bit of America and community spirit to the lives of employees assigned abroad.



George Mason University Korea draws on an extraordinary combination of people, place and values to create a top institution of global higher education. The **Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution** is a community of faculty, students, staff, alumni, and partners with a fundamental commitment to building peace. Through the development of cutting-edge theory, research, education, and practical work, we seek to identify and address the underlying causes of conflict and provide tools for ethical and just peacebuilding on the local, national, and global stages. abroad.



The **Center for Future Defense Technology and Entrepreneurship** stands at the forefront of the global defense innovation ecosystem. As the only defense innovation hub in South Korea, we aim to advance the global defense innovation ecosystem through events, publications, strategic network partners, and in-house experts and advisors.



The **Sejong Society** is a non-partisan, and all-volunteer tax-exempt organization dedicated to informing, developing, and connecting young professionals interested and engaged in U.S.-Korea affairs. Our ultimate goal is to inspire the next generation, regardless of political and career affiliations, of Korea and Northeast Asia specialists.

Calendar of Events

June 2023

- **Tuesday 6th:** Memorial Day (ROK)
- **Wednesday 14th:** Army's Birthday (U.S.)
- **Friday 23rd:** 70th Anniversary Celebration of Korean War Armistice
- **Saturday 25th:** 73rd Anniversary of the Korean War
- **Friday 30th:** U.S. Embassy Independence Day Reception

July 2023

- **Tuesday 4th:** Independence Day (U.S.)
- **Saturday 8th:** 3rd Anniversary Memorial Ceremony for General Paik Sun-yup
- **Monday 17th:** Constitution Day (ROK)
- **Wednesday 19th:** The 9th Commemoration Ceremony of the Battle of Daejeon
- **Tuesday 25th:** KUSAF Thanksgiving Breakfast for UN Veterans
- **Thursday 27th:** 70th Anniversary of the Armistice; Commemoration in Busan (ROK)
- **Thursday 27th:** National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day (U.S.)
- **Friday 28th:** Summit of Veterans Affairs Ministers
- **Friday 28th - Saturday 29th:** Intergenerational Harmony Festival

August 2023

- **Friday 4th:** Coast Guard's Birthday (U.S.)
- **Tuesday 15th:** Liberation Day (ROK)
- **Tuesday 15th - Friday 31st:** Ulchi Freedom Shield

September 2023

- **Monday 4th:** Labor Day (U.S.)
- **Friday 15th:** National POW/MIA Recognition Day (U.S.)
- **Monday 18th:** Air Force Birthday (U.S.)
- **Thursday 28th - Saturday 30th:** Chuseok (ROK)

Community News

- The FAOA Korea Chapter had its largest ever in-person turnout for a FAO Social at the Four Seasons Hotel in Seoul. Special thanks to KUSAF, Consul-General Lee, Seo-young, and our FVEY partners!
- Thank you to Joseph Phippen for providing details on his billet in South Korea and best of luck in your next assignment. If you would like to share your billet please get in touch by email: editor.faoakc@gmail.com
- If you would like to attend future events, including socials, coffee & chats with distinguished guests and panels, then sign up to our distro list by emailing: SecretaryFAOAKC@gmail.com

If you have any news to share, including personal or career achievements and upcoming events, please email editor.faoakc@gmail.com



FAOA Korea Chapter hosting visitors from the Atlantic Council

Distinguished Members



Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. She has been an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri and was a founding co-director of MU's Institute for Korean Studies. Her work focuses on East Asia, authoritarian politics, and American national security. She holds a doctorate from Harvard University; an M.Phil from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar; and a bachelor's from Stanford University.



Derek Grossman

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at RAND focused on a range of national security policy and Indo-Pacific security issues. He served over a decade in the Intelligence Community, where he served as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs. He holds an M.A. from Georgetown University in U.S. National Security Policy and a B.A. from the University of Michigan in Political Science and Asian studies.



Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig

Dr. Kongdan "Katy" Oh Hassig is an independent scholar. She has been a Senior Asia Specialist at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation. She has taught at the University of California San Diego, George Washington University, and the University of Maryland Global Campus in Asia. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Board of Directors of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and the Board of Directors of the Korea Economic Institute of America. She was a founding co-director of The Korea Club of Washington, D.C.



Soo Kim

Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University. Her research interests include the Korean Peninsula, Russia, Indo-Pacific strategy, near-peer competition, decision making, propaganda, and the intelligence community. She served as an analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency and also worked at the Department of Homeland Security. Kim earned a B.A. in French from Yale University and an M.A. in International Relations/Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.



Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim

Sung Hyun "Andrew" Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School. Prior to this, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford University. Mr. Kim retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 28 years of service and was the first Assistant Director of the CIA, Korea Mission Center. As the Chief of CIA Station in three major East Asian cities, Mr. Kim managed the collection, analysis, production, and distribution of information that directly affected national security. He is a recipient of the CIA Director's Award and the Presidential Rank Award.

Heino Klinck



Heino Klinck is a former U.S. Army China FAO who last served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. His experience includes 2+ decades abroad; leading strategy efforts in a Fortune 100 company; senior political-military roles in the Pentagon; analytical and operational responsibilities in the intelligence community; and diplomatic postings in Europe and Asia. Mr. Klinck has a B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Boston University; an MBA from the University of London; an M.S. in Global Strategy and Security from the University of Rome; and he was awarded a Fellowship by Stanford University's Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Mark William Lippert



The Honorable Mark William Lippert has a distinguished career in the United States government that spanned approximately two decades. From 2014-2017, he served as the U.S. ambassador and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea. He previously held positions in the Department of Defense, including as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He graduated from Stanford University with a B.A. in Political Science and holds an M.A. in International Policy Studies from the same institution.

Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti



General (Retired) Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti led a distinguished, 41-year career in the U.S. Army, and most recently served as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of U.S. European Command. Prior to this, he served as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea/United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command. GEN(R) Scaparrotti graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, and his education includes the Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and a Master's degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

Suzanne Vares-Lum



Major General (Retired) Suzanne Vares-Lum served 34 years in the U.S. Army and is President of the East-West Center. She is an influential executive with leadership and planning experience spanning the Indo-Pacific region, violent extremist organizations, and natural disasters. She most recently served for five years as one of the most senior leaders in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and now serves as a strategic consultant and advisor. Vares-Lum received a B.A. in Journalism and an M.Ed. in Teaching from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and a Master's degree in Strategid Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Major General Mark Gillette, Honorary Member

Mark Gillette is a U.S. Army major general and the Senior Army Foreign Area Officer. He has extensive experience from various political-military assignments throughout Asia. MG Gillette holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy, a Master of Social Science from Syracuse University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is currently assigned as the U.S. Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché in Cairo, Egypt.

MG Gillette advised and supported the initiatives of the co-founders of the FAOA Korea Chapter—both leading up to the organization's establishment and during its formative period. He continues to play an active role in the events and activities of the FAOA Korea Chapter today and is a key advocate for the development of its membership. In recognition of his significant contribution toward accomplishing the mission of the FAOA Korea Chapter, MG Gillette was presented Honorary Membership on July 23, 2020.



Board Members



Wei C. Chou, *President*

Wei C. Chou is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelors of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the University of Hawaii as an East-West Fellow. After eight years as an airborne and mechanized infantryman, Wei served across a range of FAO capacities in Hawaii, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

Contact: PresidentFAOAKC@gmail.com



Chris Hobgood, *Vice President*

Chris Hobgood is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Lander University; a Master of Science degree from Webster University; and a Master of Arts degree from Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Chris has over 22 years of service and worked in a variety of FAO assignments by advising senior military and civilian leaders with regional expertise on the Indo Pacific region as a Security Cooperation officer, a political-military officer, and Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché.

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Karen DeLoria, *Treasurer*

Karen DeLoria is a U.S. Army Indo-Pacific FAO. She holds an Associate in Arts in Japanese from the Defense Language Institute, a Bachelor of Arts degree in Business Administration from Cal Poly Pomona, and a Master of Science in Project Management from Missouri State. Karen has over 18 years of service including a decade of experience in the Army Engineer Regiment.

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Josh Duran, *Secretary*

Josh "Duran" Duran is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy. After serving eight years as a Naval Intelligence Officer, he has served two additional tours in the Republic of Korea as an FAO.

Contact: SecretaryFAOAKC@gmail.com



Adrian Romero, *Chief of Public Relations*

Adrian Romero is an active duty Warrant Officer in the U.S. Army. He holds an A.A. degree in Applied Science and is currently pursuing an M.B.A. He has over ten years of work experience in the Indo-Pacific region.

Contact: PAOFAOAKC@gmail.com

Staff Members

Editor in Chief

Emily Stamp is a London based Editor at International SOS, working with global security teams to publish incident alerts and risk forecasts. She holds an undergraduate M.A. in Psychology from the University of St. Andrews and an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King's College London.

Assistant Editor

Apoorva Jayakumar holds a Masters degree in Global Finance and Economy from Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. She has a keen interest in reading about Indo-Pacific strategy & policy.

Marketing Coordinator

YoonJeong Choi is a student pursuing a business bachelor's degree at Purdue University in Indiana State. Her interests include IT, HoloLens, environment, space technology, and e-commerce.

Research Intern

Salome Giunashvili is a recent Master's degree candidate in International Studies from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. She holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Tbilisi State University. Her research interests span across several different areas involving international security, hybrid warfare and alliance politics.

Senior Researcher

Amos Oh is a U.S. Army Strategist with extensive policy and planning experience. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and also earned an M.P.A. from the Harvard Kennedy School. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California.

Associate Researcher

Sean McCauley is an instructor based in South Korea. He is a political science graduate of the University of Alberta with a special focus on international relations; and he has extensive background in political advocacy in Canada.

Graphics Designer & Social Media Assistant

Sara La Cagnina is a Communications Manager who graduated with an M.A. in International Tourism from the Università Della Svizzera Italiana. She has extensive experience with digital communication and event coordination.

About the Korea Chapter

The FAOA Korea Chapter was founded in July 2020 in accordance with Article VII of the FAOA Charter. It is a 501(c)19 non-profit organization, consisting primarily of current and former Foreign Area Officers and International Affairs Specialists who advance the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-U.S.) Alliance through events and activities that promote mentorship, education, research, and connection.


Our Mission

To develop and inspire leaders engaged in the advancement of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

Our Core Values

- Commitment to Leader Development
- Pursuit of Inspiration

Lines of Effort



CALL FOR ARTICLES

Contribute to the journal of the FAOA Korea Chapter,
The Joint Communiqué,
for the 3rd quarter of 2023.



Deadline for submissions: August 6, 2023
Contact: editor.faoakc@gmail.com



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